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Conclusion: Regional Elections
in Comparative Perspective
Arjan H. Schakel and Régis Dandoy
15.1. Introduction
The 13 country studies presented in this book have analyzed the
territorial heterogeneity of the vote in regional and national elec-
tions with the main aim of studying regional election results on their
‘own terms’ rather than solely from a second-order election perspec-
tive. Each chapter has explored the explanatory power of regional
institutions and territorial cleavages with regard to regional electoral
behavior (top-down approach), but the country experts have also pro-
vided additional causes or explanations for diverging regional party
systems (bottom-up approach). In addition, all authors have looked at
five aspects of electoral behavior which constituted the ‘backbone’ of the
analytical framework for all country chapters. First, the authors looked
at congruence between the regional and the national vote. Congruence
of the vote was differentiated into three indicators: party-system, elec-
torate and election congruence. In a second step, they assessed how
far differences in the vote could be related to second-order election
effects (turnout in regional and national elections and change in vote
shares between regional and national elections) or to regionalized elec-
toral behavior (congruence between regional and national governments
and non-statewide party (NSWP) strength in regional and national elec-
tions). To place the regions in a comparative context, we provide average
scores on the five dependent variables in Table 15.1. Average scores
are calculated across all regions and all elections since 1970; the year
1970 has been chosen because regional elections were introduced in
the 1970s or later in 9 out of our 13 countries (Belgium, Denmark,
France, Germany (eastern Länder), Greece, Italy (regioni a statuto ordi-
nario), Norway, Spain and the UK) (see Table 1.1). In addition, the
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Table 15.2 Classification of regional elections in Western Europe
Nationalized Mixed Regionalized
Länder (Austria) Länder (Germany) Gemeenschappen/Gewesten
Régions Amter/Region the Faroe Islands and
Greenland
Nomoi/Peripheries Regioni a statuto ordinario Regioni a statuto speciale
Provincies Non-historic
comunidades autónomas
Historic comunidades
autónomas
Fylker Län Cantons
London Northern Ireland, Scotland,
Wales
chapters show that regional electoral behavior has changed considerably
since the 1970s in the countries where regional elections have taken
place since 1945 (Austria, Germany (western Länder), Italy (regioni a
statuto speciale), the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland).
The main task we take up now is to assess the factors which lead to
‘regionalization’ or ‘nationalization’ of the regional vote. That is, we
ask the following question. Which factors may contribute to increasing
territorial heterogeneity of the vote and/or to diverging regional elec-
toral arenas? In Table 15.2 we classify regional elections as regionalized,
nationalized or mixed on the basis of the average scores displayed in
Table 15.1 and by relying on the conclusions drawn by the authors of
the country chapters. We hasten to say that this classification does not
do justice to the significant variation in the extent of nationalization of
regional electoral behavior found for specific regions or for specific time
periods.
In the regionalized category, we may find countries where congruence
of the vote (especially electorate congruence) and government congru-
ence tend to be low (indicated by high dissimilarity scores), second-
order election effects are minimal and NSWPs (often with a claim for
decentralization) tend to be electorally strong. The most extreme cases
for regionalization are resembled by Gemeenschappen/Gewesten, the Faroe
Islands and Greenland, and Northern Ireland. Dandoy notes (Chapter 3)
that in Belgium the statewide parties split along linguistic lines dur-
ing the 1960s and 1970s, and therefore no party competes across the
statewide territory. The party systems of the Faroe Islands and Greenland
are completely incongruent to the party system of Denmark proper.
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278 Conclusion
That is, none of the Danish parties participate in elections in each of
the three ‘territories’. A similar case of almost complete party system
incongruence can be observed for Northern Ireland in the UK.
Regional electoral outcomes can be regionalized in other ways as well.
In Switzerland, most statewide parties tend to have regional strongholds
which comprise a number of cantons. Bochsler and Wasserfallen
(Chapter 13) note that the Swiss People’s Party is electorally strong
in the predominantly agricultural and protestant cantons, whereas the
Christian People’s Party recruits its electorate in the Catholic, mainly
rural and mountainous cantons.
Regional electoral behavior in Gemeenschappen/Gewesten, the Faroe
Islands and Greenland, cantons and Northern Ireland stand out with
respect to the turnout gap between regional and national elections.
Turnout in regional elections is systematically much lower in regional
elections than in national elections except for these regions where we
actually find that regional turnout is very close to or higher than turnout
in national elections. This might be an indication that voters rank
regional elections on a par with national elections, or that they consider
regional elections to be first-order elections.
A third way to recognize regionalized electoral behavior is exempli-
fied by the regioni a statuto speciale in Italy and the historic comunidades
autonomás in Spain, where NSWPs obtain significant vote shares, often
close to or above 30 per cent, which differentiates them from the ‘nor-
mal’ regions. This is also the reason why Massetti and Sandri (Chapter 8)
and Gómez Fortes and Cabeza Perez (Chapter 11) analyze the special and
historic regions separately from the ordinary and non-historic regions.
Elections taking in place in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales may
also be placed in the regionalized category due to the electorally strong
NSWPs.
By classifying elections as regionalized, we do not want to suggest
that second-order election effects are absent. On the contrary, govern-
ment parties tend to lose and opposition parties tend to win vote share
in elections for the regioni a statuto speciale, the historic comunidades
autonomás, and Scotland and Wales. Nevertheless, these electoral out-
comes can indicate regionalization as well because most NSWPs in these
regions participate in regional and national elections. At the national
level, these parties often find themselves in the opposition role because
in national parliament they tend to be small parties which are not
included in statewide government. Regional voters tend to switch their
vote from a statewide party in national elections to an NSWP in regional
contests, as is evidenced by higher vote shares for NSWPs in regional
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elections than for national elections. Because the parties in statewide
opposition do not tend to be the beneficiaries of dissatisfaction with
parties in national government, we think it is justified to interpret these
kinds of vote share switches as regionalized electoral behavior rather
than second-order election effects.
Nationalized electoral outcomes may be found for elections in the
Austrian Länder, régions, nomoi/peripheries, provincies, fylker and London
(see Table 15.2). Here, congruence of the vote (especially electorate con-
gruence) and government congruence tend to be high (indicated by
low dissimilarity scores); there are clear second-order election effects,
and NSWPs, if present, tend to be electorally weak. Jenny (Chapter 2)
takes up the question whether low volatility between regional and
national elections in Austria indicates that voters base their vote choice
in regional elections on cues taken from the regional or national elec-
toral arena. He sides with the latter explanation because there are no
NSWPs and the dissimilarity in the vote, which is increasing in more
recent elections, may be ascribed to new parties which obtain their sup-
port unevenly across the territory. New party success is interpreted by
Jenny as an antigovernment swing – that is, a second-order election
effect.
Escalona, Labouret and Vieira (Chapter 5), Skrinis (Chapter 7), Schakel
(Chapter 9) and Rose and Hansen (Chapter 10) are quite straightforward
in their interpretation of election results for régions, nomoi/peripheries,
provincies and fylker: these are all nationalized elections. It is also in
these regions where we can find the strongest second-order election
effects, and some authors even suggest – on the basis of higher turnout
figures for local elections than for regional elections (the Netherlands)
or with the help of local election studies where voters were asked
directly which type of election they find most important (Norway) –
that voters conceive local elections to be more important than regional
elections.
In the mixed category, we have placed countries where aggregate
regional electoral outcomes point toward regionalization as well as
nationalization. In the amter/region, German Länder and län congru-
ence of the vote and government congruence are high (indicated
by low dissimilarity scores) – which points toward nationalization.
However, second-order election effects are muted or practically absent
(amter/region and län) or NSWPs tend to be moderately strong (German
Länder). Both of these are indications of regionalization. Individual-
level survey data allow Bhatti and Hansen (Chapter 4) and Berg and
Oscarsson (Chapter 12) to conclude that regional election results are
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280 Conclusion
more properly understood as nationalized outcomes. Therefore, regional
elections in amter/region and län side more to the ‘nationalized’ than
to the ‘regionalized’ category. In the chapter on Germany (Chapter 6),
Jeffery and Middleton take up the same question as posed by Jenny in
the chapter on Austria (Chapter 2). Should dissimilarity in the vote be
interpreted as an articulation of regional identity or as a protest against
whoever is in federal government? Jeffery andMiddleton can rely on the
work by Völkl et al. (2008) which enables them to conclude that both
statewide and region-specific factors seem to drive Land election results.
Hence German Land elections might perhaps resemble the ideal case of a
mixture of nationalized and regionalized regional election results which
are reflections of differentiated multilevel statehoods among regional
electorates.
‘Contradicting’ regional election results may also be observed for
regioni a statuto ordinario and the non-historic comunidades autónomas.
Congruence between the regional and the national vote and govern-
ments is relatively low (indicated by high dissimilarity scores) but, in
contrast with amter/region and län elections, there is a relatively strong
antigovernment swing. Despite these indications for nationalization, we
can also observe that opposition parties in national parliament are not
the main beneficiaries of dissatisfaction with parties in national govern-
ment. Rather, it seems that NSWPs increase in electoral strength but,
in contrast with regional elections in the ‘regionalized’ category, NSWP
strength does not coincide with territorial cleavages (see Table 1.3).
Massetti and Sandri (Chapter 8) observe that interelection volatility
is increasing over time for regioni a statuto ordinario and they relate
this trend to two regionalizing factors: first, an increase in the num-
ber and vote shares for regionalist parties which participate in elections
in multiple regions (the Lega Nord andMovimento per le Autonomie); and,
second, a reform in regional voting systems which introduced a seat
bonus for the winning presidential list and favored a ‘personalization’
of electoral competition. Gómez Fortes and Cabeza Perez (Chapter 11)
relate differences between regional election results for the historic and
non-historic comunidades autónomas to regional identities and territo-
rial cleavages. However, when we view the non-historic comunidades
autónomas from a cross-regional perspective we may see that region-
specific parties are relatively strong in the non-historic comunidades
autónomas as well, and this leads us to place these regions in the mixed
category.
The classification of regional elections allows us to assess the valid-
ity of the hypotheses developed in the Introduction. However, before
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we turn to this discussion we will first consider three ‘caveats’ with
regard to the interpretation of congruence of the vote (Section 15.2).
In Section 15.3 we assess the impact of regional institutions and
cleavages (top-down approach) and in Section 15.4 we summarize
the findings and insights which derive from the bottom-up approach.
In Section 15.5 we point out fruitful avenues for further research.
15.2. Caveats with regard to the interpretation
of congruence of the vote
The analysis of regional electoral outcomes by the authors of the coun-
try chapters leads us to identify three caveats in the interpretation of
congruence of the vote. The first concerns the interpretation of low
dissimilarity scores which indicate high congruence between regional
and national elections. Congruence between regional and national elec-
tions is often taken as an indicator of nationalization, which, at least in
part, is based on the assumption that national elections have a first-
order status. Voters do not change their vote between national and
regional elections because they base their vote choice in regional elec-
tions on their preference in the more important national elections.
However, the country chapters show that this assumption might not
always hold. Election congruence – which compares the national vote
at the regional level to the regional vote at the regional level (NR –RR) –
is relatively high for elections taking place in Gemeenschappen/Gewesten,
provincies (pre-1980s), regioni a statuto ordinario (pre-1990s) and cantons.
Yet Schakel (Chapter 9) and Massetti and Sandri (Chapter 8) con-
clude for, respectively, the provincies and regioni a statuto ordinario that
high congruence points toward nationalized regional elections, whereas
Dandoy (Chapter 3) and Bochsler and Wasserfallen (Chapter 13) take
high congruence scores for, respectively, Gemeenschappen/Gewesten and
cantons as evidence for regionalized national elections. The authors
need to resort to other dimensions of voting behavior in order to
establish the appropriate interpretation. Both party-system (the national
vote at the national level compared with the regional vote at the
regional level (NN –RR)) and electorate congruence (the national vote
at the national level compared to the national vote at the regional
level (NN –NR)) are low for Gemeenschappen/Gewesten and cantons (indi-
cated by higher dissimilarity scores) but are higher for provincies and
regioni a statuto ordinario (indicated by lower dissimilarity scores). This
is a clear indication that in Belgium and Switzerland national election
results are regionalized instead of regional elections being nationalized.
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These findings also point out that it is very useful to analyze the three
congruence measures simultaneously.
The second caveat involves the interpretation of inter-election
volatility (election congruence) whereby high dissimilarity scores are
often taken as an indication of regionalization. However, the countries
with the strongest second-order effects are also the ones where we may
find high inter-election volatility. Elections in régions, nomoi/peripheries
and fylker score relatively high on party-system and electorate con-
gruence (indicated by low dissimilarity scores), which are signs of
nationalization, but score low on election congruence (indicated by
high dissimilarity scores), which implies regionalization. The authors
conclude that elections in régions, nomoi/peripheries and fylker are nation-
alized because vote-switching between national and regional elections
concerns vote share losses for parties in statewide government and vote
share gains for parties in national opposition. In these regional elec-
tions, voters take their cues from the national political arena and base
their vote choice on the governmental status of parties at the statewide
level. Although regional and national electoral vote shares differ sub-
stantially, regional election results can still be considered as nationalized
outcomes.
When we take the first two caveats together, we may conclude that
nationalized regional electoral outcomes can lead to two different ‘con-
stellations’ of the vote congruence measures. Nationalized regional
elections may be indicated by congruence between party systems,
electorates and elections, whereas a second form of nationalization may
be revealed by congruent party systems and electorates but dissimilarity
between elections. In the first case, voters cast their vote for the same
parties in regional and national elections because they do not differenti-
ate between electoral arenas. In the second case, voters switch their vote
between national and regional elections but they still base their vote
choice on cues taken from the national rather than the regional elec-
toral arena. The two forms of nationalized regional elections may even
be present in the same country. Massetti and Sandri (Chapter 8) observe
for the regioni a statuto ordinario similar voting behavior in regional
and national elections before the party system collapse in the 1990s
but second-order election effects clearly increase afterward. Similarly,
Schakel (Chapter 9) notes for provincies that the process of deconfes-
sionalization has transformed provincial elections from producing the
same results as for national elections to provincial electoral outcomes
exhibiting strong second-order election effects.
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A third caveat concerns the assumption that a subordinate status
of regional elections vis-à-vis national elections implies that regional
elections do not matter for first-order, national politics. One obvious
effect of second-order election outcomes is that parties in national gov-
ernment are weakened in their governing capacity because the ‘voter’
has vented their dissatisfaction with national policies. It is not uncom-
mon to replace ministers or to change policies after regional elections
have been held. However, we would like to point to another impact
of regional elections which concerns what we label as a ‘springboard
effect’. The introduction of electoral arenas amplifies the possibilities for
political entrepreneurs to establish new political parties. The required
number of votes needed to obtain a seat in regional parliament is
often far lower than for national parliaments. Once a new political
party has been successful in the regional electoral arena, entry costs for
participating in national elections may be significantly lower. A party
organization, a number of party members and a campaign are all in
place and the new party might also have gained (national) visibility.
Several country chapters report on a springboard effect. For exam-
ple, Jenny (Chapter 2) looks at newly established parties that managed
to obtain seats in national or regional parliaments and he observes
for the Austrian Länder that one party made a simultaneous entry at
both levels but six parties obtained seats in a regional parliament first.
The reverse order of national electoral success prior to regional success
has not occurred yet. The springboard effect can be quite substantial.
Massetti and Sandri observe increasing dissimilarity in the Italian vote
since the 1990s and they ascribe this trend to the rise of the Lega Nord
in the northern regions and, to a lesser extent, to electoral success of the
Movimento per le Autonomie in the southern regions. Both parties have
their origin in regional parliaments, both were able to break through to
the national level and together they account for about 10 per cent of
the statewide vote.
15.3. Top-down approach: regional institutions,
territorial cleavages and electoral cycles
In the Introduction we noted that the second-order election model
relies on a ‘stakes-based’ assumption. The extent to which we may
observe second-order election effects in regional elections is inversely
related to the perceived ‘stakes’ by voters. Following Jeffery and Hough
(2009) we hypothesized that regional institutions – most importantly
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regional authority – and territorial cleavages may increase the stakes in
a regional election. One important intervening variable is the timing
of regional elections. Jeffery and Hough (2006, pp.249–250) note that
stronger second-order election effects may be observed when regional
elections are held on the same day (horizontal simultaneity), and both
elections tend to function according to a single, statewide logic when
national and regional elections are held on the same date (vertical
simultaneity).
In Table 15.3 we assess the impact of regional authority, territorial
cleavages and electoral simultaneity on vote share changes between
national and regional elections and turnout in regional elections
(second-order election effects). We employ a linear regression model
whereby elections are nested in regions and the model includes a con-
trol for correlation in second-order election effects over time. Regional
authority is measured by the regional authority index (see Section 1.3)
and territorial cleavages are indicated by introducing two dummy vari-
ables, one measuring whether there is an indigenous regional language
that is different from the dominant (plurality) language in the state, and
the other indicating whether the region has not been part of the current
state since its formation (see Section 1.4). We also introduce dummy
variables for vertical simultaneity with national and local elections, and
horizontal simultaneity with other regional elections (see Table 1.2).
Finally, we introduce a dummy variable for compulsory voting which
should reduce second-order election effects as well, in particular the
turnout gap.1
The results in Table 15.3 confirm our expectations. A 1-point increase
on the regional authority index leads to a 0.21 percentage point decrease
in the turnout gap, to a 0.31 percentage point smaller vote share loss for
government parties and a 0.21 percentage point smaller vote share gain
for opposition parties. Similarly, vertical simultaneity with national and
local elections led to a reduction in the turnout gap (6.19 respectively
1.34 percentage points), to smaller losses for parties in national govern-
ment (by 3.46 respectively 1.83 percentage points) and to smaller gains
for parties in national opposition (by 1.12 respectively 0.12 percentage
points; the latter result is not statistically significant). Finally, horizontal
simultaneity among regional elections leads to a further increase in the
turnout gap of 3.46 percentage points.
Territorial cleavages matter too. When a minority language is present
in a region, it will lead to a 3.28 percentage point smaller turnout gap
and when the region was assimilated into the state relatively late it
leads to a 1.20 percentage point smaller vote share loss for government
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Table 15.3 Top-down approach: Multivariate analysis of second-order election
effects
Turnout
gap
Vote share changes
Government
parties
Opposition
parties
Regional authority index 0.21∗ 0.31∗∗ −0.21∗
score (0.12) (0.09) (0.10)
Regional language index 3.28∗∗ −1.02∗ 0.17
(0.79) (0.60) (0.44)
Regional history index −0.00 1.20∗∗ −0.20
(0.67) (0.42) (0.28)
Vertical simultaneity 6.19∗∗ 3.46∗∗ −1.12∗∗
with national elections (0.49) (0.42) (0.31)
Vertical simultaneity 1.34∗ 1.83∗∗ −0.12
with local elections (0.88) (0.57) (0.39)
Horizontal simultaneity −3.46∗∗ 1.52∗∗ 0.39
with regional elections (0.79) (0.65) (0.70)
Compulsory voting 5.56∗∗ 1.08∗∗ −0.67∗
(0.57) (0.45) (0.32)
Constant −10.41∗∗ −9.92∗∗ 2.84
Rho 0.594 0.278 0.146
Wald Chi2 316∗∗ 168∗∗ 89∗∗
R2 0.11 0.03 0.03
N elections 2277 2252 2154
N regions 246 244 242
N countries 13 13 13
Notes: ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01 (one-tailed).
Shown are the results of a linear regression model with panel corrected standard errors (elec-
tions are clustered in regions) in between parentheses. The models include a control for
autocorrelation over time (rho). The turnout gap is the difference between turnout in a
regional election compared with the turnout in the previous national election. Vote share
changes compare the vote share of a regional election with the vote share obtained in the
previous national election. Vote shares changes are summed per type of party.
parties. The presence of a minority language actually increases second-
order effects; government party vote share losses increase with 1.02
percentage points. This result corroborates our interpretation given
above for the observation of losses for government parties in elections
for the regioni a statuto speciale, the historic comunidades autonomás,
and Scotland and Wales. In these regions, voters tend to vote strate-
gically for statewide parties in national elections but switch their vote
in regional elections to their sincere preference for NSWPs, which tend
to participate in regional elections only. As a result, parties in statewide
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government lose vote share but parties in opposition in the statewide
parliament are not the beneficiaries.
The results presented in Table 15.3 also shed some light on particu-
lar country study findings. Massetti and Sandri (Chapter 8) and Gómez
Fortes and Cabeza Perez (Chapter 11) observe that, in contrast with their
expectations, turnout is lower in the regioni a statuto speciale and his-
toric comunidades autónomas than for the regioni a statuto ordinario and
non-historic comunidades autónomas. One explanationmay lie in vertical
simultaneity between regional and local elections, which is the case for
ordinary and non-historic but not for the special and historic regions.
A stakes-based approach to regional elections assumes that voters are
more inclined to cast a vote when regional elections tend to coincide
with other types of election because the ‘combined stakes’ of the ‘elec-
tion event’ are higher than for a single election event (Schakel and
Dandoy, 2014). Further evidence for a stakes-based interpretation is pro-
vided by a comparison of turnout gaps between regional and national
elections for Dutch provincial elections (since the 1970s: 20 per cent),
which are held non-simultaneously with local elections, and regional
elections in Denmark proper (14 per cent) and Norway (16 per cent),
which are held simultaneously with local elections.
Table 15.3 presents one contradictory finding: under horizontal simul-
taneity, the turnout gap increases by 3.46 percentage points but the
vote share loss for parties in statewide government declines by 1.52
percentage points. The former finding indicates stronger second-order
election effects whereas the latter finding suggests reduced second-order
election effects. The result for the turnout gap can be explained by ‘a
lack of stakes’; horizontal simultaneous elections do not induce the
voter to cast a vote because elections are not multiplied in a partic-
ular region. However, when regional elections are held on the same
date one might expect more involvement of candidates, media and par-
ties from the statewide electoral arena because for them elections are
multiplied. Hence concurrent regional elections may lead to an approx-
imation to a first-order, national poll. Particular country study findings
corroborate the role of campaigns with regard to second-order election
effects. Skrinis (Chapter 7) observes an exceptionally large number of
new parties participating in the Greek regional elections of 2010 and
relates this to voter dissatisfaction with the austerity measures taken by
the government to combat the fiscal crisis. Similarly, Berg and Oscarsson
(Chapter 12) explain the largest vote share loss for the party in statewide
government in Swedish regional elections of 1966 by the timing of the
regional elections which were held at the peak of public discontent with
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the housing situation, which was invigorated by a badly received TV
performance by the prime minister.
The electoral timing of regional elections vis-à-vis national elections
shows a similar nuance in the extent to which we may observe second-
order election effects. Several authors have linked the antigovernment
swing to the placement of the regional election in the national elec-
tion cycle. Escolana, Labouret and Vieira (Chapter 5) observe that the
party in statewide government lost significant vote shares in the elec-
tions of 1992, 2004 and 2010 but not in the elections of 1986 and
1998. The elections in 1986 were held simultaneous with elections to
the National Assembly, and the elections of 1998 were held within one
year after national elections. Regional elections are held near mid-term
of the national election cycle in Greece and Norway and, indeed, Skrinis
(Chapter 7) and Rose and Hansen (Chapter 10) report the highest losses
for government parties of up to 10 per cent. Similarly, Gómez Fortes and
Cabeza Perez (Chapter 11) observe significantly smaller losses for the
party in statewide government when Spanish regional elections are held
close to the previous or to the next national election. Finally, Schakel
(Chapter 9) calculates Pearson correlations for the days between Dutch
provincial and national elections and party vote share changes, and he
observes associations of –0.77 for parties in national government and
0.52 for parties in national opposition.
Based on the top-down approach, we may concur with the conclu-
sion drawn by Jeffery and Hough (2006, pp.250–251) – who looked at
regional elections in Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Italy, Spain
and the UK – that ‘The general finding, then, is that most sub-state
elections do indeed appear to be second order, subordinate to vot-
ers considerations of state-level politics. The second order “effect” is
strongest where there is simultaneity of elections and social homogene-
ity. It is qualified where there [are] territorial cleavages’. Although the
statistical results in Table 15.3 confirm a second-order election inter-
pretation of regional electoral outcomes, the explained variance of the
models (11 per cent for the turnout gap model and 3 per cent for
the vote share changes models) indicate that a second-order election
interpretation does not get us very far. As pointed out in the Intro-
duction, we specifically aimed in this book to avoid a ‘methodological
nationalism bias’ – that is, the tendency to choose the nation-state as
a unit of analysis (Jeffery and Wincott, 2010). The second-order elec-
tion model assumes that regional election outcomes are shaped by
first-order national factors and, consequently, measurement of second-
order election effects basically pits national election results against
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regional electoral outcomes. We asked the chapter authors to specif-
ically consider any factor beyond regional authority and institutions,
and territorial cleavages, which, according to them, may contribute to
diverging regional party systems. In the next section we will discuss the
main findings resulting from the ‘bottom-up’ approach.
15.4. Bottom-up approach: Statewide parties,
electoral rules and regional government
The bottom-up approach applied in each of the chapters leads
us to identify three factors or variables which contribute to the
regionalization of the vote. Here we would like to discuss statewide
parties, electoral rules and regional government, all of which appear in
several country chapters.
The first variable concerns the extent to which statewide parties are
able to integrate the territory. Swenden and Maddens (2009a, p.253)
highlight the important role of statewide parties in integrating national
and regional party systems: ‘the more successful [statewide] parties are
in garnering electoral support across the regions of the state in statewide
and regional elections, the stronger is the integration of the party sys-
tem’. Following Swenden and Maddens (2009a) we may ask to what
extent the organization, strategies and policies of the statewide parties
are related to party system (de)nationalization. The clearest but also the
most extreme example of the integrative role of parties is Belgium, where
the split of the Christian-democratic, liberal and socialist statewide
parties into Flemish- and French-speaking parties has led to two sepa-
rate party systems. Another telling but unique example is Italy where
the party system collapsed in the 1990s due to corruption scandals.
The major statewide parties, and in particular the Christian-democrats,
lost their dominant position and eventually even disappeared, which
opened up the party system to new and more regionally based parties
which resulted in increasing divergence between regional and national
party systems.
However, the country chapters also show that the internal party orga-
nization and ideology of statewide parties can contribute to greater
linkages between party systems. A first example are the cantons, where
national and cantonal party systems have become more integrated over
time. Boschler and Wasserfallen (Chapter 13) relate this nationalization
trend to the professionalization of party organizations of the statewide
parties at the federal level. Swiss parties used to be run by cantonal
branches, which organized campaigns for both cantonal and federal
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elections. At the federal level, the party was dominated by volunteers
and lacked financial means. Over time, several parties have shifted funds
to their federal offices and increased the number of professionals at the
federal level, which – in conjunction with the development of media
which increasingly covers both German- and French-speaking cantons –
led to a nationalization of the federal and cantonal vote.
A second example which underlines the role of party organization is
provided by the Dutch provincies. Despite significant provincial auton-
omy, partly exercised through an upper chamber which is elected by the
provincial assemblies, Schakel (Chapter 9) observes strong second-order
election effects in provincial elections. One of the variables he proposes
to explain this finding is the centralized candidate-selection procedures
of the statewide parties which leave little room for provincial branches
to propose candidates for the lower as well as the upper chamber of
national parliament. In other words, the effect of regional authority
is counteracted and superseded by the centralized organizations of the
statewide parties.
The integrative capacity of statewide parties may also be related to
the ideology of parties as Gómez Fortes and Cabeza Perez (Chapter 11)
show in their chapter on Spain. They find that turnout and dual voting
are lower for the non-historic comunidades autónomas where the Popu-
lar Party is dominant. In other words, regional party systems tend to be
more integrated when the Popular Party obtains most vote share than
in regions where the other major statewide party, the Socialist Work-
ers Party, gathers the absolute majority of the vote. Gómez Fortes and
Cabeza Perez hypothesize that this finding can be explained by the ide-
ology of the two major parties. The ideology of the Socialist Workers
Party is more open to regionalization of the Spanish state than the ide-
ology of the Popular Party. The authors use a content analysis of the
framework programs of the statewide parties to illustrate the differing
ideologies. The framework program is used by regional party branches
as a basis for their party manifestos. In the framework program of the
Socialist Workers Party, 25 per cent of the sentences referred to the
regions and 64 per cent addressed cooperation between the state and
regions. In contrast, 80 per cent of the text of the framework program
of the Popular Party referred to the central state.
In the Introduction we noted that the authority exercised by regional
government is often considered as a key institutional variable for
explaining regional electoral outcomes. With decentralization we expect
regional and national party systems to diverge because it creates incen-
tives for political entrepreneurs to establish region-specific parties and to
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mobilize voters according to region-specific issues. Most scholars assume
that statewide parties will react to centrifugal pressures by decentraliz-
ing their own internal organization, by allowing regional branches to
deviate from central party manifestos, and by endorsing constitutional
change that strengthens the regions (Hough and Jeffery, 2006; Maddens
and Libbrecht, 2009; Meguid, 2008). The findings from the coun-
try chapters clearly indicate that not all statewide parties adapt their
internal organization and ideology in response to increasing regional
autonomy and increasing regional party strength. This shows that the
response of statewide parties toward decentralization of authority is
not straightforward and that statewide parties may even be able to
recentralize the party system (see also Fabre and Swenden, 2013).
A second factor which is proposed by the authors as an important
explanatory variable for diverging regional and national party sys-
tems concerns electoral rules. Differences between the national and the
regional vote can be expected when different rules which translate votes
into seats are applied at the national and regional levels. Indeed, in 2
out of our 13 countries, majoritarian rules are applied at the national
level whereas more proportional rules are used at the regional level
(Table 1.3). In the UK, a first-past-the-post electoral system is used for
national elections whereas various forms of proportional representation
are applied in the devolved elections. McEwen (Chapter 14) thinks that,
in addition to other devolved institutions, proportional rules in the
devolved entities strengthen regionalized electoral behavior by produc-
ing variation in the composition of government across the UK, which
gives NSWPs a platform to advance their territorial goals. Similarly, a
proportional system for the regional level but a plurality system applied
at the national level may increase the ‘springboard effect’ of regional
elections. Escalona, Labouret and Vieira (Chapter 5) argue that the
use of a proportional electoral system for French région elections from
1986 to 1998 facilitated opening up the French national party system,
which made it easier for the far right or the ecologists to gain seats and
visibility.
The effects of electoral rules on party-system integration go beyond
the rules that translate votes into seats. The size of electoral districts
may impact heavily on the decision of parties to run for elections or
not. In Switzerland, small cantons hold only one or a few seats in the
national parliament which leads to very restricted competition for seats.
Official proportional rules may actually result in majoritarian electoral
competition when there are only one or two seats to be won. Bochsler
and Wasserfallen (Chapter 13) observe that parties participating in
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elections in small cantons often informally agree to divide the mandates
in the two chambers of national parliament. As a result, national elec-
tions often do not represent the full political landscape in small cantons,
and the regional and national vote within the canton tend to diverge.
Dandoy (Chapter 3) notes that the boundaries of electoral districts
support the separation between regional party systems in Belgium. The
electoral districts for the regions cover mostly only unilingual territo-
ries, and therefore only Dutch-, French- and German-speaking parties
compete in elections in Flanders, Wallonia and the German-speaking
community, respectively. In the bilingual Brussels region, both Flemish-
and French-speaking parties compete for the vote in elections to the
Brussels parliament but additional electoral rules prevent the develop-
ment of pan-linguistic/community lists. First, the number of seats in
the Brussels parliament is fixed for each linguistic group (17 seats for the
Dutch-speaking parties and 72 for the French-speaking parties), which
effectively means that Flemish and Walloon parties compete for differ-
ent electorates. Second, bilingual lists are forbidden in elections to the
Brussels parliament.
Italy provides a third example of how electoral rules can impact on
the regionalization of the regional vote. Reforms in 1995 and 1999 intro-
duced majoritarian elements to the proportional electoral systems of the
regioni a statuto ordinario. Nowadays, voters cast two votes: one for pres-
idential candidates (often supported by a coalition of parties) and one
for a party list (not necessarily the same coalition of parties). Seats are
distributed proportionally between parties but the coalition supporting
the winning candidate for president is awarded a seat bonus in order to
ensure a majority in the regional assembly. The seat bonus is then redis-
tributed among the parties of the winning coalition. Massetti and Sandri
(Chapter 8) argue that the reform of the regional voting systems favored
regionalization of electoral competition in the special statute regions
through the introduction of region-specific ‘presidential lists’. In con-
trast, the introduction of presidential lists contributes to the integration
of regional and national party systems in the regioni a statuto ordinario.
The latter finding is in line with those of Escalona, Labouret and Vieira
(Chapter 5), who notice that the introduction of a majority bonus of
25 per cent of the total seats to the winning list in 2004 reinforced
the second-order status of French région elections. Skrinis (Chapter 7)
does not relate the majority bonus in Greek nomoi/peripheries elections
(the winning list obtains at least 60 per cent of the seats) to the extent
of second-order election effects (in great part because the electoral sys-
tem has changed with each regional election), but from a comparative
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perspective we may safely conclude that the majority bonus contributes
to the nationalization of Greek regional elections.
The country chapters also highlight the role of regional government
in explaining regionalization of the vote. In a number of countries,
regional elections rarely result in a change in regional government.
In Austrian Länder, fylker, län and cantons, formal and informal rules
ensure that regional government consists of a coalition of parties includ-
ing most or all parties. In amter/regions and provincies proportional
electoral systems lead to large party coalitions at the regional level
whereby regional government turnover is very rare. For example, Bhatti
and Welling Hansen (Chapter 4) observe in Denmark that 9 out of
16 amter (including municipalities with amter responsibilities) did not
experience a single turnover in the party controlling the mayoralty from
1974 to 2005; and two amter only experienced turnover within one
side of the political spectrum. When regional elections do not lead to
a change in regional government, should we expect a priori voters to
vote according to regional issues? When regional elections do not mat-
ter for regional government, should we expect voters to be bothered to
cast a vote unless they want to send a signal to the national electoral
arena?
Indeed, elections in fylker and provincies display strong second-order
election effects which may suggest that voters who support the party
in national opposition are relatively more inclined to cast a vote than
those who support the party in national government (Lau, 1985). How-
ever, the authors on Austria, Denmark, Sweden, and Switzerland note
an absence of second-order election effects. The diverging results can
be explained by congruence between regional and national govern-
ments. In the Netherlands, the Christian Democratic Party has been
part of national government for decades but with parties from either
the left or the right, ensuring a clear political color of the coalition.
In Denmark and Switzerland, and to a lesser extent Austria, national
government coalitions tend to be oversized, including many or all par-
ties, and in Sweden the Social Democratic Party was dominant for
many decades, and it obtained an absolute majority of the votes and
formed single-party governments with the support of the Communist
Party. In other words, when both national and regional governments
tend to consist of multiparty coalitions or parties in government do
not change, then regional elections are not used by voters to send a
signal to parties in national government and therefore second-order
election effects tend to be muted or absent. Indeed, we may find the
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strongest second-order election effects in bipolar party systems with
genuine government alternation at the regional and national level, and
where party competition is polarized (e.g. France and Greece).
The findings with regard to the link between regional government and
the extent of second-order election effects confirm the results found by
studies which analyzed another type of second-order election. European
election research has repeatedly found that second-order election mech-
anisms are at play in elections to the European Parliament (Reif and
Schmitt, 1980; Reif, 1985; Marsh, 1998; Hix and Marsh, 2007, 2011).
These studies have also found that the loss by government parties is
more noticeable in bipolar party systems (Reif, 1985) and countries
with genuine alternation of parties in government (Marsh, 1998). Most
studies on punishing and rewarding political parties in a multilevel con-
text have focused on the American continent: Canada (Gelineau and
Belanger, 2004; Johnston and Cutler, 2003), the US (Crew and Weiher,
1996; Niemi, Stanley and Vogel, 1995; Simon, 1989) and Argentina
(Gelineau and Remmer, 2005). The federal state structure and the two-
party systems in the Americas ensure that there is a clear division of tasks
between the tiers of government, and that responsibility for policies can
be clearly attributed to one of the parties. The extent to which second-
order election effects can be found in regional elections seems to relate
to the extent to which voters can hold regional or national government
accountable in the regional electoral arena.
As the country chapters show, the nature of regional and national
governments is important but there are also indications that the way
in which competencies are divided between national and regional gov-
ernment matters too. Skrinis (Chapter 7) writes in the Greek chapter
that the duties and responsibilities of the elected prefects and regional
administrations are not clearly separated in the two metropolitan areas
(Attica and Thessaloniki) and thereby a situation is created in which
a voter cannot clearly attribute government responsibility across the
tiers. Similarly, Gómez Fortes and Cabeza Perez (Chapter 11) report on
Spanish survey data which indicate that voters do not know which tier
of government is responsible for which policies.
Related to the finding that the clarity of responsibilities across tiers
may impact on the vote are the observations about the role of regional
elections and regional government in the composition of upper cham-
bers. The way in which regional authority is exercised through shared
rule via an upper chamber may import significant nationalization
effects into regional election results. In 3 countries out of 13, we find
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an upper chamber which is elected or appointed by regional parlia-
ments or regional governments. In the Netherlands and Sweden (until
1970) the regional assemblies elect the representatives in the upper
chamber of parliament, and in both countries we find nationalized
regional elections either with or without second-order election effects.
The case of Sweden is particularly interesting because the upper cham-
ber was abolished in 1970. Berg and Oscarsson (Chapter 12) observe
that before the 1970s, second-order election effects were practically
absent whereas after 1970 and especially since the late 1980s govern-
ment parties more often experience vote share losses in county council
elections. In Germany the Land governments elect representatives in a
second chamber (Bundestag) which holds veto power on most federal
legislation. The effects of German cooperative federalism on party pol-
itics has been researched extensively but one conclusion by Jeffery and
Middleton (Chapter 6) stands out: ‘the integrative pull of cooperative
federalism co-exists in the voter’s mind with the centrifugal pressures of
Germany’s 16 regional political systems [ . . . ] reflecting a differentiated
form of multi-level statehood in Germany that is simultaneously uni-
tarist and regionally diverse’. We think that this conclusion applies to all
country chapters. Regional voting behavior moves on a regionalization–
nationalization continuum and we have identified several ‘centripetal’
(top-down approach) and ‘centrifugal’ (bottom up approach) factors
which eventually lead to different degrees and forms of nationalization
of regional elections.
We think that the three factors discussed in this section are the most
important ‘centrifugal’ factors for regional election outcomes since they
were recognized in several country chapters. Table 15.4 summarizes the
factors which come to the fore via the bottom-up approach. The list is
not complete, however. Some authors have identified additional factors
which await further analysis. To give one example, Dandoy (Chapter 3)
points to the relevance of a split media landscape in Belgium which
Table 15.4 Bottom-up approach: Variables affecting the regional vote
Statewide parties Electoral rules Regional government
Internal party
organization
Rules translating votes
into seats
Coalition government
Party ideology Size and boundaries of
electoral districts
Role of upper chamber
Presidential lists and
majority bonus
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supports and maintains a regionally divided party system. The opposite
happened in Switzerland as documented by Bochsler and Wasserfallen
(Chapter 13). Media outlets have increasingly started to cover German-
and French-speaking cantons at the expense of local and cantonal news-
papers, and the emergence of a new political cleavage around issues of
immigration and European integration have contributed to a national-
ization of the vote. For reasons of space, we refer to the country chapters
for those readers who want to inform themselves about all of the vari-
ables which have been identified by the authors as contributing to the
regionalization or nationalization of the vote.
15.5. The way ahead
An obvious first avenue for further research would be to systemati-
cally explore the effects of the ‘centripetal’ and ‘centrifugal’ variables
which are identified with the help of the top-down and bottom-up
approach. This book presents the data which allow us to pursue this
research agenda (and which we will do elsewhere) with respect to elec-
toral rules and regional government. Lacking, though, is comparative
data on internal party organization in a cross-country, cross-regional
and cross-time perspective (for a good attempt but on a limited scale, see
Detterbeck and Hepburn, 2012; Fabre, 2008; on this point also see Fabre
and Swenden, 2013). We hope that the country studies and data pre-
sented in the country Excel files (see Chapter 1) will spark off a fruitful
research agenda on regional elections.
In this final section we would like to address two further issues which
come to the fore in several country chapters and which also affect
the study of elections in general. The first concerns the limitations of
aggregate electoral data. The main research question we addressed in
this book asks whether regional elections are regionalized or nation-
alized. As we noted in the Introduction, looking at aggregate election
results will not allow us to reveal the considerations that regional voters
might have when they cast their vote. By operationalizing congruence
of the vote in multiple ways and by using various kinds of indicator,
we have tried to get the most out of the aggregate data. Party-system
congruence can be broken down into electorate and election congru-
ence (see above for definitions), which enable the researcher to identify
the main causes of diverging regional and national party systems.
We may find party systems to diverge because electorates have differ-
ent preferences or because voters switch their vote between elections.
Different preferences of electorates can often be related to territorial
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and sociological cleavages with respect to language, history or economy.
Dual voting or vote-switching, however, may indicate nationalization or
regionalization of regional elections. Here two additional indicators may
be of help. When second-order election effects play a role, we expect to
observe vote shares switches from parties in national government to
parties in national opposition. However, when dual voting arises out of
regional identities or regional issues, we would expect vote shares for
NSWPs to increase.
One should be careful in taking the electoral strength of NSWPs as
direct evidence of regionalized election behavior. A prediction of the
second-order election model is that small parties gain vote share in
regional elections and most NSWPs are small parties, particular in a
national context. Hence we proposed to look at the ideology of those
NSWPs in order to provide additional evidence for regionalization. The
clearest example whereby NSWPs are indicative of regionalized regional
elections are regionalist parties which explicitly mobilize the regional
electorate on the basis of more government powers for the region, or
even secession of the region from the state. However, the country chap-
ters have shown that other kinds of regionally based parties may point
to regionalized election behavior as well. An example is given by Berg
and Oscarsson (Chapter 12) in the case of Sweden where we may find
health-care parties in several lan which specifically mobilize the regional
voter on the issue of the centralization of healthcare services to the
capitals of the counties. The health-care parties do not participate in
national elections and given that hospitals are run almost completely by
the county councils, we can safely assume that the health-care parties
are a sign of regionalized election behavior.
On the other hand, the case of Sweden also points out that we should
still be careful not to jump to conclusions on the basis of aggregate
election data. When we calculate average dissimilarity scores over all
regional elections, we find a difference of 3.2 per cent for election con-
gruence. This is by far the lowest figure for all 13 countries (averages
are all above 8 per cent; see Table 15.1). This finding is not so sur-
prising given that all local, regional and national elections have been
held on the same date since 1970. What is surprising, though, is that
Berg and Oscarsson look at individual survey data from election studies
which show that ticket-splitters between national and county elections
have increased from 6 per cent in 1970 to 27 per cent in 2010 (see
Figure 12.2). Therefore, we strongly advise the use of individual survey
data when interpreting aggregate election results.
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Nevertheless, in this book we decided to focus on aggregate electoral
outcomes rather than on individual voter surveys for several reasons.
First, we asked the authors to cite regional election studies when avail-
able and it appears that voter surveys are especially rare for regional
elections. In addition, most national election surveys do not allow
for a regional breakdown because often there are too few respondents
per region. Moreover, different questions are asked in different surveys
which significantly hamper comparison. Second, most regional election
surveys are recent whereas the institutional and political context at the
regional and national level has changed quite dramatically over the past
four decades. To be able to study the effects of these changes on elec-
toral behavior, we have to rely on macrolevel outcomes. Third, there
is still a lot to gain from a macrolevel approach as we hope we have
shown here. Conducting surveys among voters is expensive and time-
consuming, and to make them more effective and efficient we need to
gain further insights into the territorial heterogeneity of the vote and
the factors that might impact on the vote so that we can better target
voters and ask better questions.
The second issue we would like to raise involves the ‘orderness’ of
elections. Several authors question whether regional elections should be
conceived as ‘third-order’ rather than second-order elections. The most
direct and strongest evidence for ‘orderness’ of elections is reported by
Rose and Hansen (Chapter 10) for Norwegian fylker. In the local elec-
tion study of 1999, voters were asked to indicate which kind of election
is most important to them. Only 2 per cent of the respondents said that
fylker elections were most important whereas 72 per cent indicated par-
liamentary elections and 27 per cent municipal elections. When asked
how important voters perceived fylker elections to be, 53 per cent of all
respondents indicated that they were of little or no importance while
only 10 per cent responded that they were of great importance. Schakel
uses turnout data as an indicator on how important Dutch voters find a
particular kind of election. He finds that before 1987, provincial turnout
was consistently higher (up to 7 per cent) than local turnout. How-
ever, since 1987 turnout for provincial elections has been between 4
and 13 per cent lower than for local elections. Here we compare the
regional vote to the vote cast in election to the lower house of par-
liament with the assumption that the latter are often conceived to be
the most important elections by voters. Escalona, Labouret and Vieira
(Chapter 5) rightfully question this assumption in their chapter on
France. They draw on turnout data to show that presidential elections
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are probably the first-order election: in 2007, voter turnout in the first
round of the presidential election was 85.3 per cent whereas it was
61 per cent in the first round of the legislative elections held a few weeks
later.
The issue of ‘orderness’ of elections has been raised by scholars who
analyzed and compared several types of second-order election (Heath
et al., 1999; Rallings and Thrasher, 2005; Skrinis and Teperoglou, 2008).
Heath et al. (1999) studied the almost simultaneous local and European
elections in the UK and the results of their analysis induced them (1999,
p.391) to suggest that ‘If the elections to the European Parliament are
regarded as second-order, then we might think of elections to local
councils as “one and three-quarters order”.’ The in-depth country stud-
ies presented here clearly show that the extent of second-order election
effects in regional elections differs widely and the findings also ques-
tion whether a second-order election perspective is the most appropriate
framework for the study of regional elections. The question about ‘order-
ness’ of elections goes beyond researching the conditions under which
regional elections retain first- or second-order election effects. We think
that this question opens up a whole new research agenda on multilevel
electoral systems or multilevel party systems.
Multilevel party systems are characterized by a dispersion of elections
and authority across several tiers of government. According to Swenden
and Maddens (2009b, p.6) ‘the multilevel party system brings together
a statewide party system which emerges from statewide elections and
a set of regional party systems reflecting the outcome for regional elec-
tions’. A full understanding of party competition in federalized party
systems ‘requires consideration of these separate party subsystems, as
well as the interactions between them’ (Gibson and Suarez-Cao, 2010,
p.37). By approaching elections from a multilevel party system perspec-
tive, we arrive at new and interesting research questions, such as the
following. When and how do voters make use of the opportunities of
voice provided by the various types of election? To what extent do voters
hold regional, national or European government responsible across elec-
toral arenas? However, we may also arrive at normative questions: when
regional elections are found to be third-order elections, it might reveal
a subnational democratic deficit in analogy to the democratic deficit
in the European Union. Given the rise in number of subnational and
supranational (European) elections combined with increasing authority
at both the subnational and supranational (European) level, the study
of multilevel party systems and the study of elections beyond national
ones becomes increasingly important.
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Note
1. In other work, we analyze regional electoral outcomes in greater detail. For
congruence of the vote, see Schakel (2013); for turnout, see Schakel and
Dandoy (2014); for vote share changes between regional and national elec-
tions, see Schakel and Jeffery (2013); and for NSWPs, see Massetti and Schakel
(2013).
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